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CIVIL RIGHTS- EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES:
COMMON LAW CONTROL IS THE BEST TEST
OF "EMPLOYEE" WITHIN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells,
538 U.S. 440 (2003)
I. FACTS
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. (CGA) is a medical cli-
nic in Oregon that was created as a professional corporation in 1979.1 The
doctors belonging to CGA were the sole shareholders and comprised the
board of directors. 2 However, the physicians regarded each other more as
partners than shareholders. 3 The physicians exercised sole control and
management of CGA.4 Annual profits were shared between the physician-
shareholders in the form of a bonus.5 Under Oregon Revised Statute
Section 58.185, each physician-shareholder enjoyed limited liability from
the obligations of the firm because of CGA's corporate form, but each
physician-shareholder was individually liable for any malpractice suit
brought against him or her.6 At the time of this lawsuit, CGA had four phy-
sicians who were physician-shareholders. 7
Deborah Anne Wells (Wells) was hired by CGA as a bookkeeper in
1986.8 Wells was diagnosed with mixed connective tissue disorder.9 As a
1. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440
(2003) (No. 01-1435).
2. Id.




6. Id. Oregon Revised Statute § 58.185(3) states,
In the rendering of specified professional services on behalf of a domestic professional
corporation to a person receiving the service or services, a shareholder of the
corporation is personally liable as if the shareholder were rendering the service or
services as an individual, only for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions or
misconduct committed by the shareholder, or by a person under the direct supervision
and control of the shareholder.
OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185(3) (2003).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440
(2003) (No. 01-1435).
8. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442 (2003).
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result of her disorder, Wells made several requests that would have allowed
her to continue her bookkeeping position.10 CGA offered Wells a transfer
to a patient coordinator/receptionist position." Wells was given medical
leave from CGA until May 12, 1997.12 On May 12, Wells was terminated
for not returning to work at the end of her first medical leave.13
Wells sued CGA for a Title I violation of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA).14 The ADA states that it is unlawful for employers to
discriminate against qualified individuals based on a disability.15 CGA
moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not within the scope of
the ADA.16 Only a business with fifteen or more employees is a "covered
entity" subject to the ADA.17 If the four physician-shareholders were not
considered employees, CGA would not be a covered entity under the ADA
because it had fifteen employees for only ten weeks in 1996 and for only
eight weeks in 1997, making CGA two weeks short of being a covered
entity. 18
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon distin-
guished the two tests it could apply. 19 The first test the court analyzed was
the "economic realities test," which examines the factual characteristics of
the business to determine whether the shareholders are more like partners
rather than director-shareholders. 20 The other test analyzed was the "per
se" approach, which holds a business to the corporate form it has chosen,
9. Brief for Respondent at 1, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440 (2003) (No. 01-1435).
10. Id.
11. Petitioner's Brief at 6, Clackamas (No. 01-1435).
12. Respondent's Brief at 1, Clackamas (No. 01-1435).
13. Id. at 2. One disputed issue was whether Wells had notified CGA that her personal doc-
tor had given her a second medical leave. Id. at 1. Wells claimed she notified CGA of the second
medical leave. Id. CGA claimed she voluntarily resigned by not returning to work on May 12
and that she never contacted CGA about the second medical leave. Petitioner's Brief at 6,
Clackamas (No. 01-1435).
14. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442 (2003); see
generally Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000) (prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination of disabled people and requiring accommodations for disabled people).
15. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., No. CV 99-406-AS, 2000 WL
776416, at *2 (D. Or. May 5,2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2) & 12112(a)).
16. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442.
17. Id. "Employer" under the ADA is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person[. " 42 U.S.C. §
12111 (5)(A).
18. Wells, 2000 WL 776416, at *2.
19. Id. at **3-4.
20. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442 (2003).
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making director-shareholders employees. 2 1 The district court found the
economic realities test to be more persuasive because it emphasized more
function rather than form. 22 After examining the characteristics of CGA,
the district court held CGA's physician-shareholders were "more analogous
to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a general corporation."
23
The district court granted CGA's motion for summary judgment.
2 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's decision.2 5 The court compared the economic realities test and the
per se approach and found that use of a corporate form of business ends the
debate over whether director-shareholders are partners.
26 The court found
that the decision to incorporate was a voluntary one, which yielded limited
liability and retirement tax benefits. 27 Furthermore, the court held that a
company should not receive the "best of both possible worlds" by allowing
shareholders to be considered partners, consequently excluding the business
from the scope of the ADA.28 The court concluded that CGA's physician-
shareholders were employees, thus meeting the ADA's fifteen employee
threshold. 2
9
Judge Graber issued a strong dissent in the case arguing that the
economic realities test should have been applied.3 0 Judge Graber concluded
that the per se approach was too concerned with labels rather than reali-
ties. 3 1 CGA was required to follow many aspects of a partnership.
32 In
closing, Judge Graber reemphasized that the original purpose of the fifteen
21. Wells, 2000 WL 776416, at **2-3. This approach is referred to as the "per se" approach
by Kristin Nicole Johnson in her Michigan Law Review note. Kristin Nicole Johnson, Note,
Resolving the Title VII Partner-Employee Debate, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1091 (2003).
22. Wells, 2000 WL 776416, at *4.
23. Id. The district court found that with the fast changing landscape of available business
forms, economic realities must be applied because the labels of partnership or professional
corporation does not answer the question of who is an employee. Id. Also, under professional
corporation statutes, directors of professional corporations are similar to partners in that they are
owners who share in management and control. Id.
24. Id. at *5.
25. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 271 F.3d 903, 903 (9th Cir. 2001)
26. Id. at 905.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 906.
30. Id. (Graber, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 908. Professional corporations are owned by the directors who share in the
management and profits of the business. Id. The directors also enjoy limited liability from the
obligations of the firm, although each director is personally liable for any malpractice claim made
against him or her. Id.
2004)
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employee threshold was to relieve very small businesses from the
potentially crushing expenses of defending ADA claims. 33
CGA appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 34 The Court
framed the issue as "whether four physicians actively engaged in medical
practice as shareholders and directors of a professional corporation should
be counted as 'employees.' 35 It held that control within the common law
of agency was the best gauge of whether a director-shareholder of a




The ADA's purpose of requiring an employer to have fifteen or more
employees is to spare small businesses from the potentially catastrophic
economic effects of having to learn the details of employment discrimi-
nation laws and developing policies to deal with them.37 The ADA defines
an employee as "an individual employed by an employer," 38 which
provides little help when applying the ADA.39 Three different tests de-
veloped as methods of determining who is an employee within the context
of federal laws: (1) the "Economic Realities Test" (ERT), (2) the "Per Se"
Approach, and (3) the "Common Law of Agency Test" (agency test).40 A
very sharp circuit split developed between the ERT and the Per Se
Approach within employment discrimination laws.41 The agency test had
mainly been used by the Supreme Court to determine whether a person was
an employee or an independent contractor under federal law.42
A. THE ECONOMIC REALITIES TEST
The ERT did not make a decision based on an individual's title within
an association; instead it looked beyond the label to the facts of the case to
33. Id. (citing Papa v. Katy Indus. Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999)).
34. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003).
35. Id. at 442.
36. Id. at 448.
37. Papa, F.3d at 940 (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995);
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2000).
39. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 444.
40. Id. at 442-45.
41. Id. at 444 (citing EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984);
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986); Devine v.
Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1996)).
42. Id. at 444-45 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)).
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determine whether an individual is an employee. 43 With professional cor-
porations, the issue has been whether director-shareholders are employees
or more analogous to partners.an In the context of general partnerships, the
issue has been whether a partner was an employee or a "bona fide partner,"
who is considered an employer.4 5 A "bona fide partner" is an individual
who has unlimited personal liability in partnership obligations, shares the
profits and losses of the partnership, shares joint ownership in the
partnership, and/or is a fiduciary to the partnership.a6
One of the first cases dealing with the issue of who an employee is
within the context of a corporate entity was Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Cooperative, Inc.47 Goldberg involved a member cooperative corporation
rather than a professional corporation.4 8 Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.
(Whitaker) sold knitted, crocheted, and embroidered goods made by its
members in their own homes.49 New members joined by submitting a work
sample to Whitaker. 50 If the sample was acceptable, the person was made a
member by paying dues of $3 and accepting Whitaker's bylaws.
5'
Goldberg sued Whitaker for violations of the minimum wage, record-
keeping, and industrial homework regulations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).52 The Court held that members of a cooperative were em-
ployees protected by the FLSA.53 In examining the relationship between
the members and Whitaker, the Court noted that the members were part of
one organization, they were paid for their work from the organization, the
management of Whitaker set all prices, and the management could fire the
43. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400 (1 lth Cir. 1991).
44. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d at 1177 (stating that "the narrow issue presented in
this appeal is whether shareholders in a professional corporation engaged in the practice of law are
also employees of that corporation for purposes of Section 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964...").
45. See Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1996)
(reviewing lower court's granting of the defendant employer's motion for dismissal for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted).
46. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 267, 276 (10th Cir. 1987) (referring to the
various factors of the partnership position as "the total bundle of partnership characteristics").
47. 366 U.S. 28 (1961).
48. Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 29. A professional corporation is a corporate business entity
whose business is within a professional trade such as law, medicine, or engineering. 18 AM. JUR.
2D Corporations § 37 (1985). A member cooperative corporation is a separate corporate coopera-
tive association that is owned and operated by members who buy into the corporation to make a
profit. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Cooperative Association § 1 (1985).
49. Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 29.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 29-30; see generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000) (preserving minimum standards
for employment issues such as workable hours and a minimum wage that employers must follow
with their employees).
53. Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32.
2004]
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members. 54 The economic reality of the situation was that the member
homeworkers were identical to other employees. 55 However, the Court also
stated that "[t]here [was] nothing inherently inconsistent between the co-
existence of a proprietary and an employment relationship," holding open
the possibility a person could be both a person of authority within a busi-
ness association and an employee within the meaning of employment law.56
In EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association,57 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) lawsuit against a nonprofit charitable society.58 The suit in-
volved the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association's (FCSLA) policy that
women serving as officers and on the board of directors must have been
sixty-six or younger when they were nominated for the position. 59 The dis-
trict court held that since the women involved in the suit were serving as
directors of the FCSLA, they were employers and not employees protected
under the ADEA.60 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the district court had interpreted the ADEA definition of employee,
which was exactly the same as the ADA's definition of employee, too
narrowly. 61 The court noted that the term "employee" should have a broad
meaning; the court stated labels such as director should have no bearing on
whether an individual is an employee. 62 The women performed normal sal-
aried employee duties such as maintaining records, preparing financial
statements, and managing the office.63 The women were employees en-
titled to the protection of the ADEA.64
The United States Supreme Court again addressed who was a protected
employee under employment discrimination statutes in the important case
of Hishon v. King & Spalding.65 Hishon was an associate attorney who had
been passed over for promotion to partner by the law firm of King &
Spalding (K & S).66 Claiming the rejection was based on her sex, Hishon
54. Id. at 32-33.
55. Id. at 33.
56. Id. at 32.
57. 694 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1982).
58. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n., 694 F.2d at 1069.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1070; see also 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2000) (defining employee).
62. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n., 694 F.2d at 1070 (citing Cincinnati Ass'n for the
Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1982); Dunlop v..Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139,
142 (6th Cir. 1977)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
66. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 72.
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filed a complaint with the EEOC.67 The district court dismissed Hishon's
Title VII action, stating that it did not apply to selection of partners in a par-
tnership. 68 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.69
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether individuals vying for the
position of partner in a partnership were employees and covered by Title
VII.70 Looking at Title VII and its legislative history, the Court found
nothing that excluded partner candidate decisions.71 Had Congress wanted
to exclude such employment decisions from protection under Title VII, it
would have affirmatively stated partnership decisions are exempt from Title
VII coverage.72 Thus, there could be no per se exclusion of partners under
Title VII. 73
Justice Powell delivered a clarifying concurrence.74 He emphasized
that the majority's holding did not extend Title VII protection to partners
who truly make up the management of the partnership, stating that the
relationship between partners was significantly different than the relation-
ship between employer and employee.75 Justice Powell made certain that
employers could not escape employment discrimination laws by labeling
employees as partners.76 Thus, the title alone is not important; the factual
context of his or her employment relationship is the controlling test.
77 In
this form of the ERT, only bona fide partners are excluded from
employment discrimination protection.
78
Soon after Hishon, in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.,79 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals faced essentially the same issue presented in
67. id.
68. Id. at 72-73.
69. Id. at 73.
70. Id. at 73-74.
71. Id. at 77; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (2000) (prohibiting employment
practices based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
72. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,77-78 (1984).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 80 n.2.
77. Id.
78. See EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 707 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
that the EEOC may enforce its subpoena duces tecum to investigate whether thirty-two terminated
partners are bona fide partners or employees under the ADEA); see also Strother v. S. Cal.
Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing the district court's grant
of the defendant's FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion because the plaintiff partner's rights in a 2,400
to 2,500 partner medical partnership was limited enough to be an employee under the control of
the partnership's board of directors); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding that bona fide general partners are not employees under the employment anti-
discrimination acts).
79. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells 80 in the form of a
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII (Title VII) lawsuit.8' Dowd was a
professional corporation that had three shareholders and an insufficient
number of traditional employees to bring it under the umbrella of Title
VII's fifteen employee minimum. 82 The district court found that Dowd
could not be an employer because it did not have the minimum number of
employees and granted Dowd's motion for summary judgment.83 When
Dowd came before the Seventh Circuit, the court held that the shareholders
in a professional corporation were more similar to a partner in a partnership
than a shareholder of a corporation. 84 The economic reality of the case was
that Dowd's shareholders managed, controlled, and owned the professional
corporation, much like partners manage, control, and own a partnership. 85
The reasoning in Dowd was soon adopted by other courts.86  In
Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Company, P.A.,87 a member-shareholder of a
professional corporation brought a claim of age discrimination under the
ADEA against his former firm.88 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for Metcalf, Zima, & Company (Metcalf), stating Fountain was not an
employee.89 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Seventh
Circuit, stating labels like professional corporation or partnership are not
controlling.90 The facts of the case must be the determining factors. 91 The
court acknowledged the ERT was more probative than the per se ap-
proach.92 The ERT factors important to this court included Fountain's role
in management, level of control, and ownership of Metcalf.93 Fountain
shared in Metcalf's profit and losses, was compensated based on profits,
was personally liable, and at the time in dispute had a thirty-one per cent
80. 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
81. Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1177; Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442.
82. Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (defining employer as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year").
83. Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1177-78.
84. Id. at 1178.
85. Id.
86. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir. 1991); see also
Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 80 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the facts
of the case, and not the kind of business association, should control the outcome of the case).
87. 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991).
88. Fountain, 925 F.2d at 1399.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1400.
91. Id. (citing EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (S.D. Fla.
1989)).
92. Id. at 1401.
93. Id. at 1400-01.
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interest in Metcalf.94 Weighing these factors, the economic reality was that
Fountain was a partner, not an employee. 95 Fountain was not protected by
the ADEA and summary judgment was affirmed. 96
In Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C.,97 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals also adopted the ERT.98 Devine brought a Title VII ac-
tion against Stone, Leyton & Gershman (SL & G), claiming she had been
fired for complaining of sexual harassment.99 The district court granted SL
& G's motion for summary judgment, concluding it was not an employer
because its director-shareholders were not employees. 00 Since its director-
shareholders were not employees, SL & G did not have the prerequisite
fifteen employees to be an employer.101
The Eighth Circuit considered both the ERT and per se approach to
determine whether the director-shareholders were employees.t 02 The per se
approach was deemed too rigid and exalted form over substance 03 The
Eighth Circuit concluded the better test was to look at the facts surrounding
the case and examine the heart of the employment relationship.104 Like the
Eleventh Circuit, the relevant factors the court considered were the director-
shareholders' management, ownership, and control of SL & G.105 It was
undisputed that the director-shareholders of SL & G had sole control of
management, ownership, and decisions regarding policy. 106 Therefore, SL
& G's director-shareholders were not employees, and SL & G was not an
employer under Title VII. 107
Judge Heaney dissented.108 He argued that the per se approach of
holding a firm to its corporate form was the correct rule. 109 The most
important consideration for Judge Heaney was that all people within pro-
94. Id. at 1401.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 100 F.3d 78 (8th Cir. 1996).
98. Devine, 100 F.3d at 81 (citing Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Company, P.A., 925 F.2d
1398, 1401 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977)).
99. Id. at 79.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 80-81 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
102. Id. at 81.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 80-81 (citing Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima, & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir.
1991); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977)).
106. Id. at 82.
107. Id.
108. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (citing Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir.
1986)).
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fessional corporations, including shareholders (especially junior share-
holders), should be protected from employment discrimination.10
The ERT in professional corporations returned to the Seventh Circuit
in Schmidt v. Ottawa Medical Center, P.C.111 Schmidt, who was a director-
shareholder for Ottawa Medical Group (OMG), brought a suit under the
ADEA.112 The district court, relying on the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Dowd and EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood,113 granted summary
judgment for OMG because it found that Schmidt was a partner and not an
employee protected by the ADEA.114 The Seventh Circuit treated the issue
in Schmidt different from the issue in Dowd because Dowd featured a true
employee suing a professional corporation and Schmidt featured a director-
shareholder suing a professional corporation.115 The language in Sidley,
holding that the ERT was the proper test in the context of a partnership,
provided the court the link it needed between Dowd and Schmidt.116
However, the ERT had been developed without stating what specific
factors should be applied.117 The Schmidt court noted how "matter-of-
factly" the Seventh Circuit had been in Dowd while describing the ERT.118
The factors to give the ERT structure could come from two places: (1)
statutory purpose or (2) the common law of agency." 9 The court noted that
the United States Supreme Court would soon decide the issue in
Clackamas.120 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit felt no reason to establish a
list of factors.'21 However, in its opinion, the element of control would be
110. Id.
111. 322 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2003).
112. Schmidt, 322 F.3d at 462.
113. 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002).
114. Schmidt, 322 F.3d at 462, see also Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699, 703 (stating that the thirty-
two terminated partners seemed to be bona fide partners in that they shared the firms profits,
contributed capital to the firm, maintained some managerial duties, and maintained unlimited
liability, but they also had little control, which was organized primarily with the executive man-
agement committee); see also EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th. Cir.
1984) (holding that shareholders in a law firm were not employees under Title VII).
115. Schmidt, 322 F.3d at 464; see also Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1177 (alleging that Dowd was in
violation of Title VII by failing to amend its benefit plan to include pregnant women).
116. Schmidt, 322 F.3d at 464, see also Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699 (alleging that the demotion of
thirty-two partners violated the ADEA); see also Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178 (holding that share-
holders in a law firm were not employees under Title VII).
117. Schmidt, 322 F.3d at 464.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 464-65 (citing Sidley, 315 F.3d at 702 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337,346 (1997)), Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-25 (1992)).
120. ld.; Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442 (2003).
121. Schmidt, 322 F.3d at 466.
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the most important factor under both statutory purpose and agency common
law. 122
When examining the level of control Schmidt had at OMC, there was
little doubt that he was more analogous to a partner than an employee.123
As a director-shareholder, Schmidt sat on the board of directors, voted on
company policy, made decisions regarding hiring and firing of new phy-
sicians, made decisions pertaining to compensation, and actively parti-
cipated in the management of OMC.124 To summarize the ERT, the factors
of (1) control, (2) management, and (3) ownership developed as the factors
that determine whether a director-shareholder is an employee; the greater
the strength of the factors, the more likely the director shareholder is not an
employee.125
B. THE PER SE APPROACH
The per se approach holds that since a company freely chooses its form
of business organization, it should not be allowed to take advantage of other
business forms when it serves the business's purpose. 126 The first case to
adopt the per se approach was Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates,
P.C.127 Hyland was an officer and director of New Haven Radiology
Associates (NHRA), a professional corporation.128 He brought suit under
the ADEA, claiming he was forced to resign because of his age.129
Applying the ERT, the district court granted NHRA's motion for summary
judgment because NHRA was more analogous to a partnership, making
Hyland more like a partner and not covered by the ADEA.130 Although the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that NHRA shared many
characteristics with partnerships, it found no reason to allow NHRA the
benefits of a partnership by allowing it to become a pseudo-partnership
when it served NHRA's purpose.' 3' The court held that all individuals of a
122. Id.
123. Id. at 467.
124. Id.
125. See Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the factors of control, management, and ownership do not need to be equal, and other relevant
factors can be evaluated).
126. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986).
127. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
128. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 794.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 794-95.
131. Id. at 798.
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professional corporation, no matter what his or her position within the com-
pany, were employees protected by the ADEA. 132
Judge Cardamone dissented.133 He reasoned that there was no need to
accept a per se approach because labels and titles do not dictate out-
comes. 134 Also, the ADEA does not require all people working for a pro-
fessional corporation be an employee.135 The Supreme Court and the
EEOC had both endorsed the fact based ERT.136 Judge Cardamone would
have adopted a two factor ERT as follows: (1) whether the director-
shareholder was compensated through profits and losses of the professional
corporation, and (2) how much control the director-shareholder exercised in
the professional corporation.137
The Second Circuit began to show how unworkable the per se
approach could be in EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc.138 Johnson &
Higgins, Inc. (J & H) was a private corporation managed by a board of
directors.139 Members of the board of directors were also employees of J &
H and had to maintain regular employee duties after joining the board of
directors.140 The directors had almost exclusive ownership of J & H's stock
and were compensated based on the firm's profits.141 J & H had a retire-
ment policy requiring members of the board to retire between the ages of
sixty and sixty-two.142
A former director, who was forced to resign for reasons other than the
retirement policy, contacted the EEOC. 143 The EEOC began an investi-
gation of J & H for possibly violating the ADEA.144 The EEOC brought a
claim against J & H based on its own investigation.145 Relying on Hyland,
the district court partially granted the EEOC's motion for summary
132. Id.
133. Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 798-99
135. Id. at 799.
136. Id. at 801 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1984); EEOC Decision
No. 85-4, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) $ 6845, at 7040 (Mar. 18, 1985)).
137. Id. at 802.
138. 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996).
139. Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d at 1531.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1532.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1533. The director Burt Sempier was asked to resign as part of a downsizing
retirement program for "poorly performing" employees who were fifty-five or older. Sempier v.
Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 45 F.3d 724, 726 (3d Cir. 1995). He was eventually terminated. Id.
144. Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d at 1533.
145. Id. at 1533-34.
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judgment because J & H was a corporate entity so its directors could not be
partners outside the ADEA.146
On appeal, J & H argued its board of directors was analogous to part-
ners rather than employees. 147 The Second Circuit stated its holding in
Hyland did not require all director-shareholders of a closely held corporate
entity to be considered employees.148 It instead purported that "the Hyland
court looked to the director's role in the company to determine whether
there existed an employment relationship in addition to the role of direc-
tor." 149 Citing a district court opinion, the Second Circuit pointed to other
courts that have applied a common law agency test to determine the
issue. 150 The test had three factors: "(1) whether the director has under-
taken traditional employee duties; (2) whether the director was regularly
employed by a separate entity; and (3) whether the director reported to
someone higher in the hierarchy."lS' The court found that all three prongs
were satisfied and held that J & H's directors were employees under the
ADEA. 152
Judge Jacobs dissented in the opinion.153 He argued the correct ap-
proach was the ERT.154 Control of the corporation was with the board of
directors, and the economic reality of the case was that the members of the
board of directors were employers and not within the ADEA.155 Judge
Jacobs also stated that the three factor test applied by the majority was not
helpful in determining whether a director is an employee within a firm. 156
146. Id. at 1533 (citing Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir.
1986)).
147. Id. at 1537.
148. Id. at 1539.
149. Id. (citing Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Lattanzio v. Sec. Nat'l Bank, 825 F. Supp. 86, 90 (E.D. Pa. 1993)); see also
Chavero v. Local 241, Div. of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 787 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that a union's executive board members were not employees under Title VII);
Zimmerman v. N. Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 351-52 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that two
directors were not employees under ADEA); EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1430, 1433-34 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (finding two family members were employees protected by Title
VII); Schoenbaum v. Orange County Ctr. for the Performing Arts, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1036, 1038
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (concluding that assuming the roles of director and trustee was sufficient to
qualify as an employee under ADEA).
152. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1539 (2d Cir. 1996). The court held
that a retirement policy requiring employees to retire based only on their age, if under sixty-five,
was a violation of the ADEA. Id. at 1540.
153. Id. at 1543 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1545-46 (citing Chavero, 787 F.2d at 1157 (per curiam)).
156. Id. at 1544.
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C. THE COMMON LAW OF AGENCY TEST
The third approach to define employee was developed through the
common law of agency.157 The agency test follows the non-exhaustive fac-
tors found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 220(2).158 The
following factors determine if an individual is an employee or independent
contractor:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instru-
mentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 159
In NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America,160 the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that the debit agents of United
157. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (finding a
sculptor was an independent contractor and his work was not work for hire in the context of
copyright jaws); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (ruling
that the common law of agency should be applied to determine if an insurance agent was an
employee or an independent contractor under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258-59 (1968) (holding that insurance
agents were employees and not independent contractors exempt from the National Labor
Relations Act).
158. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. 751-52 (finding a sculptor was an
independent contractor and his work was not work for hire in the context of copyright laws).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1957).
160. 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
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Insurance Company of America (UICA) were employees for purposes of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered UICA to bargain
with the agents.161 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
the agents were independent contractors and exempt from coverage under
the NLRA.162 The Supreme Court stated that the proper test to use in light
of the NLRA's purpose was the agency test.163 Applying the agency test,
the Court noted that UICA's agents were part of the normal operations of
UICA, were trained by UICA, did business under UICA's name with
guidance from UICA's managers, were compensated by UICA, reported to
UICA, and were terminated by UICA if their performance dropped.164 The
Court concluded for these reasons the agents were employees and the
NLRB's order should be enforced. 165
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,166 the Supreme Court
expanded the use of the agency test to copyright law. 167 Reid was a
sculptor who agreed to create a modern nativity scene for the non-profit
group Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV).168 The dispute a-
rose when Reid and CCNV wanted to take the nativity sculpture on separate
tours. 169 CCNV sued Reid for copyright ownership.170 The district court
concluded that the statue was "work made for hire," Reid was CCNV's
employee, and CCNV was the exclusive trustee with all copyrights to the
work.171
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
stating Reid was an independent contractor and the sculpture was not work
made for hire.172 Thus, the issue for the Supreme Court was whether Reid
161. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 255; see generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)
(providing a basic structure for labor relations between employers and unions).
162. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 255.
163. Id. at 256.
164. Id. at 259.
165. Id. at 260.
166. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
167. Cmty.for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751.
168. Id. at 733.
169. Id. at 735.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 738. A work made for hire is,
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2)
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). If work is work made for hire, it belongs to the person for whom the
work was made. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
172. Cmty.for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 736.
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was an employee or an independent contractor in light of copyright law. 173
The Court decided to continue the tradition of applying the common law of
agency when the definition of employee is unclear.174 It adopted the
agency test, stating,
Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are [1] the skill
required; [2] the source of the instrumentalities and tools; [3] the
location of the work; [4] the duration of the relationship between
the parties; [5] whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; [6] the extent of the hired
party's discretion over when and how long to work; [7] the
method of payment; [8] the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants; [9] whether the work is part of the regular business of
the hiring party; [10] whether the hiring party is in business; [1 1]
the provision of employee benefits; and [12] the tax treatment of
the hired party. 175
The control factor of the common law is the dominating aspect of
whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor.176 Reid
was an independent contractor because he exercised absolute control over
his own work. 17
7
The Court followed Community for Creative Non-Violence and the
agency test in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden.1
78
Darden was an agent for Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
(Nationwide).179  When Nationwide terminated its relationship with
Darden, he began selling insurance policies issued by Nationwide's
competitors.180 Nationwide retaliated by stripping Darden of his retirement
benefits.18l Darden claimed Nationwide violated the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).182 The district court granted Nationwide's
motion for summary judgment, finding Darden was an independent
contractor.18 3 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, adopting an
173. id. at 738.
174. Id. at 739-41.
175. Id. 751-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)).
176. Id. at 751.
177. Id. at 752-53.
178. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
179. Darden, 503 U.S. at 319-20.
180. id. at 320.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 321.
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alternative to the agency test. 184 The Supreme Court reversed stating that
the test to apply was the agency test adopted in Community for Creative
Non-Violence. 85 It was for the court of appeals to decide the ultimate de-
cision of whether Darden was an employee, and the case was remanded.186
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas joined.187 The majority concluded that how much control a
director-shareholder of a professional corporation exercised over the pro-
fessional corporation was the correct test to determine whether a director-
shareholder of a professional corporation was an employee.188 The factors
of this test were the non-exhaustive list provided in the EEOC Compliance
Manual.189 Justice Ginsburg dissented, in which Justice Breyer joined.190
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Certiorari was granted to enable the Court to settle the circuit split that
had emerged regarding who was an employee in the context of professional
corporations.191 The Court noted that the circuit split involved the ADA
and other employment discrimination statutes. 192
The Court acknowledged that the definition of "employee" in the ADA
is completely circular, so a gap-filler was needed to construe a true meaning
of employee.193 As demonstrated in Darden, the Court stated it has pre-
ferred the common law of agency to be the gap filler when providing a
definition for employee.194
184. See id. at 321-22 (stating the test as, (1) the individual reasonably believed he would
receive benefits, (2) the individual relied on this belief, and (3) the individual could not bargain
out of the contracts forfeiture provisions).
185. Id. at 323 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989)); see also Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 442-44 (6th Cir. 1996) (adopting its
own common law test, which was very similar to the ERT, in an ADEA and ERISA action to
determine whether a former partner of Ernst & Young was an employee or bona fide partner).
186. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 328 (1992).
187. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 441 (2003).
188. Id. at 448.
189. Id. at 449-450 (citing EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (BNA) § 605:0009 (2002)).
190. Id. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 444.
192. Id. n.3 (citing Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir.
1996); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986); EEOC
v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984)).
193. Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)).
194. Id. at 444-45 (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23).
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The Court considered CGA's argument for the ERT, which urged the
Court to determine whether a director-shareholder was in reality a
partner. 195 However, the Court found that the ERT, which inquired whether
director-shareholders were in reality partners, would "simply beg the
question" in a world where some firms have hundreds of partners, including
many who would be more appropriately deemed employees because of their
lack of control.196 The appropriate consideration would be whether the
director-shareholders were employees, not whether the director-
shareholders were partners.197 Simply looking at whether a director-
shareholder was more analogous to a partner did not solve the problem. 198
The Court was equally unpersuaded by Wells' argument that the Ninth
Circuit correctly decided the case. 199 It noted that applying the per se
approach ignored two things: (1) the purpose of the fifteen employee thres-
hold was to give small firms a better chance of success and (2) Congress
expected the courts to apply common law when Congress has not been
exact in a statute.20O
The Court shifted its focus to the common law of agency.2 01 The Court
stated the agency definition of "servant" provided guidance by focusing on
the control a master has over its servant.202 The Restatement's specific test
distinguishing servants from independent contractors was deemed appli-
cable by the Court as the crucial first step in determining the control
relationship between a director-shareholder and a professional cor-
poration.2 03 It agreed with the EEOC's view that if the director-shareholder
was subject to the control of the professional corporation, he or she was an
employee of the professional corporation. 204  However, the Court
195. Id. at 445 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 9, 15-16, 21, Clackamas Gastroenterology
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 358 U.S. 440 (2003) (No. 01-1435)).
196. Id. at 446.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n.2 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring); EEOC v. Sidley, Austin, Brown, & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 709 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente
Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1996)).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 447 (citing Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs, P.C., 271 F.3d 903, 908
(9th Cir. 2001) (Graber, J., dissenting) (quoting Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th
Cir. 1999)); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1992)).
201. Id. at 448.
202. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958) (stating "A servant is an
agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the
performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master")).
203. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1958)).
204. Id. (citing Brief of Amici Curiae the United States and the Equal Employment




continued, if the director-shareholder controlled the professional corpora-
tion, he or she was a proprietor, and not an employee for ADA purposes.
2 05
The Court stated that the EEOC was the expert body that must address
discrimination in employment issues. 206 It was persuaded by the EEOC
Compliance Manual, which contained a list of six factors the Court found
helpful in determining whether the professional corporation controlled the
director-shareholder or the director-shareholder controlled the professional
corporation.2 07 The six factor test the Court deferred to was,
[1] Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set
the rules and regulations of the individual's work
[2] Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises
the individual's work
[3] Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization
[4] Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to
influence the organization
[5] Whether the parties intended that the individual be an
employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts
[6] Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and
liabilities of the organization..
208
The Court stated that its model definition of employer was a person or
persons who owns and manages a business, hires and fires employees, as-
signs work to the employees, supervises that work, and decides how to
distribute profits and losses. 209 The Court emphasized that titles alone are
not determinative.210
The Court noted that the list was not exhaustive and should be con-
sidered along with all the other facts of the case.211 The Court held that
control, found in the common law of agency and the EEOC Compliance
Manual, should guide a court's decision on the issue of who was an
205. Id. (citing United States' Brief at 8, Clackamas (No. 01-1435)).
206. See id.
207. Id. at 449.
208. Id. at 449-50 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (BNA) § 605:0009 (2002)).
209. Id. at 450.
210. Id. (citing EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (BNA) § 605:0009 (2002)).
211. Id. n. 10 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992); Brief of
Amici Curiae the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 9,
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (No. 01-1435)).
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employee.2 1 2 It concluded that the control emphasis found in the EEOC
factors will prevent a court from becoming preoccupied with titles such as
shareholder, director, partner, or employee. 213 Because there were facts
that indicated that CGA's physician-shareholders were not employees, as
well as facts that would have indicated that they were employees, the Court
decided that lower courts should apply the standard set forth in the opinion
to the facts of Clackamas rather than make a final determination.21 4
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT
Justice Ginsburg agreed that the common law servant test was a
legitimate way of determining if CGA's physician-shareholders were em-
ployees. 21 5 However, she argued that the element of control was given too
much importance.2 16
Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the physician-shareholders of CGA fit
the test as servants. 17 The physician-shareholders provided services on
behalf of CGA.218 The physician-shareholders signed employment con-
tracts with CGA, received salaries and bonuses, and worked in facilities
acquired by CGA.219 Justice Ginsburg argued that the physician-share-
holders must also follow the standards of CGA.220
Justice Ginsburg noted that the physician-shareholders voluntarily
assumed the role of employee for several purposes. 22 ' They were em-
ployees for the purposes of ERISA,222 and she stated that the physician-
shareholders were employees under Oregon's workers compensation
212. Id. at 448-50.
213. Id. at 450.
214. Id. at 451. The physician-shareholders shared in the management and profits of CGA.
Brief for Petitioner at 6, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 358 U.S. 440 (2003)
(No. 01-1435). However, the physician-shareholders also signed employment contracts, received
salaries, and were considered employees for ERISA and workers compensation. Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 358 U.S. 440, 452-53 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See also Darden, 503 U.S. at 323, 328 (adopting the common-law test for employee and
remanding to the circuit court to decide the issue).
215. Clackamas, 538 U.S. 440, 452 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Darden, 503
U.S. at 322-23).
216. Id.
217. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1957)).
218. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 58.185(1)(a) (2001) (stating that "shareholders of a
professional corporation 'render the specified professional services of the corporation"')).
219. Id. at 452-53 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. at 8, Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v.
Wells, 358 U.S. 440 (2003) (No. 01-1435)).
220. Id. at 453.
221. Id.
222. Id. (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. at 6-7, Clackamas (No. 01-1435)).
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laws. 223 Also, they enjoyed limited liability by being a professional
corporation. 2
24
Justice Ginsburg also warned that the control test could prove to be
unpredictable because it may turn on the business' structure rather than
business' volume. 225 Using CGA as an example, she noted that for much of
the time in question CGA had fourteen employees, excluding the physician-
shareholders. 226 If one physician-shareholder would have sold his or her
interest in CGA and became a physician-employee, CGA would have fallen
within the scope of the ADA.227 However, Justice Ginsburg argued that the
amount of business done by CGA would not have changed.
22 8 Finally, the
dissent warned that the control test may jeopardize the most important




The Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to apply
the test.2 30 The Court's ruling in Clackamas is considered a gap-filler for
employment discrimination statutes when it comes to professional cor-
porations.2 31 One criticism was that the Court has taken a "miserly reading
of this broad civil rights law." 232 Another was that the holding has created
a new "procedural hurdle" that will allow small firms a new way to have
employment discrimination lawsuits dismissed.
233
However, there is praise for the control test because it is specific and
could make it harder for some firms to escape discrimination laws by
claiming that their shareholders are not employees. 234 The holding has
been further supported because it will protect potential plaintiffs more by
allowing judges more leeway to determine whether shareholders or partners
223. Id. (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. at 7, Clackamas (No. 01-1435)).
224. Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 58.185(4), (5), (10), (11) (2001)).




229. Id. at 455.
230. Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C., 332 F.3d 1177, 1177 (9th Cir.
2003).
231. Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Clarifies Who Must Heed Disability Act, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 23, 2003, at B4.
232. Gina Holland, Supreme Court Gives Small Companies Room to Avoid Disability Law,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 23, 2003, at C3.
233. Brent Hunsberger, Oregon Clinic's Victory in Suit Opens Door to Claims, THE
OREGONIAN, Apr. 23, 2003, at A01.
234. Holland, supra note 232, at C3.
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are in fact employees. 235 Ironically, CGA grew to have twenty-five em-
ployees and six physician-shareholders, so CGA would now be a covered
entity. 236
The Clackamas test has been used by the courts in unique and
resourceful ways.237 In the unpublished opinion of Ziegler v. Anesthesia
Associates of Lancaster, Ltd.,238 the Third Circuit returned to a case it had
deferred a decision on until after Clackamas was decided. 239 The plaintiffs
were staff physicians of the professional corporation Anesthesia Associates
of Lancaster (AAL) who wished to become shareholders.240 When they
were no longer part of AAL, they sued for sexual discrimination and re-
taliation under Title VII.241 The district court dismissed the claim on March
12, 2002, prior to Clackamas, for lack of jurisdiction because AAL had
only thirteen non-shareholder employees rather than the fifteen employee
threshold required under Title VII.242 The Third Circuit, after discussing
the Clackamas decision, explained that the ERT applied by the district court
closely resembled the Clackamas test.243 Therefore, the court held that the
correct outcome had been made and affirmed the district court's
dismissal.244
In EEOC v. Pacific Maritime Association,245 a panel of the Ninth
Circuit used the holding in Clackamas to develop a definition of employer
in a different employment issue. 246 The EEOC brought a claim on behalf of
Teresa Jones, a longshore worker who was hired by Marine Terminals
Corporation (MTC) through a dispatch hall operated by Pacific Maritime
Association (PMA).247 After leaving MTC, Jones intervened in the EEOC
claim against both MTC and PMA for sexual harassment in violation of
Title VII.248 After settling with MTC, she pursued PMA on the theory that
235. Hunsberger, supra note 233, at A01.
236. Id.
237. Ziegler v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Lancaster, Ltd., 74 Fed. Appx. 197, 201 (3d Cir.
2003).
238. 74 Fed. Appx. 197 (3d Cir. 2003).
239. Ziegler, 74 Fed. Appx. at 198; Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538
U.S. 440 (2003).
240. Ziegler, 74 Fed. Appx. at 198.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 198-99.
243. Id. at 201.
244. Id.
245. 351 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 2003).
246. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 351 F.3d at 1277.
247. Id. at 1272. A longshore worker, or longshoreman is, "a person who works at a
waterfront loading and unloading ships." WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 348 (1990).
248. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 351 F.3d at 1273.
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PMA was also her joint employer.249 The district court ruled that PMA was
her joint employer and found for Jones.250
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit looked to the factors in the Clackamas test
to construct a model definition of employer.2 51 The Ninth Circuit first
listed factors used by the Labor Department to implement the Agricultural
Workers Protection Act (AWPA), which are very similar to the common
law of agency factors and the EEOC Compliance Manual factors.
252 Next,
the Ninth Circuit cited the EEOC Compliance Manual factors used in
Clackamas.253 The court also looked to the model definition that the
Supreme Court outlined in Clackamas for guidance.
254 When applying
these non-exhaustive lists, it became apparent that PMA had no control
over MTC or Jones.255 The court noted that PMA had no supervisor
authority, it could not hire or fire, and it could not discipline workers.
2 56
Therefore, the court held that PMA was not Jones' joint employer and
reversed the district court.257 However, Pacific Maritime Association was
vacated and an en banc hearing was granted by the Ninth Circuit.
2 58 Final
adjudication of the issue had not been made at the writing of this
comment.
259
In Pearl v. Monarch Life Ins. Co.,260 a plaintiff used Clackamas to
prove that he was not an employee for ERISA purposes so that he could
continue with his state claim for breach of contract. 261 Pearl was a surgeon
and director-shareholder of D'Angelo, Pearl & Sasson, P.C. (DPS), who
held three disability buyout insurance policies through the defendant
insurance companies. 262 Pearl claimed a disability and attempted to collect
249. Id. "'Two or more employers may be considered 'joint employers' if both employers
control the terms and conditions of employment of the employee."' Id. at 1275 (quoting Wynn v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Swallows v. Barnes &
Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1997))).
250. Id. at 1271-72.
251. Id. at 1277.
252. Id. at 1275-76 (quoting Torres-Lopez v. May, 11l F.3d 633, 646 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Aldisert, J., dissenting)). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (2000); 29 C.F.R. §
500.20(h)(4)(ii) (2003).
253. Id. at 1276 (quoting Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,
449-50 (2003)).
254. Id. (quoting Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450).
255. Id. at 1277.
256. Id. All of these powers belonged solely to MTC. Id.
257. Id.
258. EEOC v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 367 F.3d 1167, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).
259. Id.
260. 289 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
261. Pearl, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
262. Id. at 325.
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on the insurance policies, but the defendants denied his claims. 263 He sued
for breach of contract, but the defendants removed the claim to federal
court under the theory that the state contract claim was preempted by
ERISA.264 Pearl did not use the Clackamas test to prove that he was an
employee, but rather an employer who was not protected under ERISA.265
The court granted Pearl's motion to remand his claim back to state court.266
Clackamas has also been used as authority in tax cases.267 The United
States Tax Court in Western Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue 268 denied applying the Clackamas control test as the common law
test to determine when an individual was an employee for purposes of the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA).269 However, the United States Tax Court in Cicciari v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 270 used Clackamas as supportive
authority to look to different factors to determine the relationship between
parties. 2 71
Business owners must be prepared for Clackamas's impact.272 There
are a number of ways a business owner can be prepared, including setting
clear expectations and providing feedback for partners, being candid with
fellow owners, explaining business decisions carefully, and trying to be
prepared for issues that arise from choosing one partner over another. 273
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Clackamas has settled the circuit split on how
to determine whether director-shareholders of professional corporations are
"employees" in the context of employment discrimination laws. 274 The
Court adopted the common law control test and used the six factors outlined
in the EEOC's Compliance Manual to address the narrower issue of
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 326-28.
266. Id. at 328.
267. Western Mgmt., Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1442, 1445 (2003).
268. 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1442 (2003).
269. See Western Mgmt., 85 T.C.M. at 1445 n.2 (stating the Clackamas rule applies only to
employment discrimination laws).
270. 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1515 (2003).
271. Cicciari, 85 T.C.M. at 1516.
272. Paul F. Mickey, Jr., Treat Your Partners Well: Firms Should Heed a Decision That
May Confer on Partners Equal Employment Opportunity Rights, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at
14.
273. Id.
274. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. P.C. v. Wells, 358 U.S. 440, 444 (2003).
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whether an individual acts independently, or whether he or she is controlled
by the firm.275
Douglas W. Murch*
275. Id. at 449-50 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) § 605:0009 (2002)).
*Thank you to my wife and family for their support throughout law school.
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